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When legal intermediation creates distrust of the law: 
The market for tax rebates in French real estate 
 
Camille Herlin-Giret (CERAPS) and Alexis Spire (IRIS) 
 
Abstract – Since the 1990s, the French government has offered tax exemptions for people 
who buy property and rent it out for at least nine years. This legal framework, centered on 
incentives, can be considered a new kind of (de)regulation of housing policy, triggering a 
multiplication of private intermediaries devoted to finding clients for tax exemptions. Based 
on interviews with twenty-eight investors who feel they have been abused (many of them 
have started legal proceedings against professionals from whom they bought a property), this 
study provides a new entry for analyzing legal intermediation, showing that it does not affect 
all laypeople in the same way, especially when looking at the latter’s social and economic 
resources. We analyze how and with what devices professionals, whose commercial practices 
are not fully regulated by law, rely on the law for the success of their transactions, especially 
with taxpayers who have money to become investors but who are not rich enough to pay for 
the services of a tax professional. We argue that the ability to resist the appeal of putting 
money into investments that turned out risky depends on investors’ social and economic 
resources. Finally, we analyze how the process of legal intermediation described in this paper 
impacts investors’ legal consciousness and creates distrust towards the law. 
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1. Introduction  
The law regulating economic activities is based on relatively broad and general 
principles that leave firms and organizations some room for maneuver in complying with it 
while protecting their interests (Edelman, 1992). These are far from binary alternatives: legal 
compliance is a process through which institutions construct the meaning and limits they 
intend to give to the legal framework (Swedberg, 2003). This work of endogenization of law 
(Edelman, 2016) is entrusted to “compliance professionals” who may be legal professionals 
such as lawyers or legal advisors; private actors such as management consultants, executives 
working inside or outside of organizations; or public agents. Firms confronted with laws 
against discrimination in the workplace, for example, make use of “complaint handlers” who 
reframe and reformulate the legal principles in accordance with managerial criteria (Edelman 
et al., 1993, Marshall, 2005). Compliance with new legal norms also affects understanding of 
the law (Pélisse, 2004), as shown by the example of hospital reforms in this issue (Vincent, 
forthcoming): middle managers may take advantage of it to increase their power within the 
organization (Kellogg, 2009). Firms make use of compliance professionals because they have 
an interest in complying with the law and they identify with the principles of justice laid down 
by the state (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Legal intermediation is, however, not only used 
to display compliance with the law: economic actors may also make use of the law for 
commercial purposes, to make them more persuasive vis-à-vis consumers when seeking to 
sell them certain goods or services. The “managerialization of law” (Edelman, 2016) then 
becomes a weapon for economic agents to exercise domination over lay clients. Whereas 
bureaucracies are in charge of the allocation of a certain number of rights and may favor or 
block access to these (Revillard, 2017: 459), private actors use the law differently, by infusing 
their own managerial logics into the legal field (Billows, forthcoming) and by taking part in 
the design of private regulation (Buchter, forthcoming).  
This article is precisely concerned with the role of legal intermediaries when they 
impact the law’s capacity to produce social change (Pélisse and Talesh, 2018). In the case of 
tax exemptions, an area that is particularly technical and legally dense, private legal 
intermeidaries pursue economics goals and profit targets. In recent decades, use of these 
devices has become increasingly widespread among private actors, meaning that households 
now assume risks previously managed by associations or the state (Hacker, 2004). On both 
sides of the Atlantic, governments have offered small savers tax rebates to become 
“investors” (Aitken, 2007, Harmes, 2001, p. 103). For example, the policy which incentivized 
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employees to organize their future pension through company savings schemes consisted in 
turning future retirees into individual investors on the markets (Carruthers and Kim, 2011; 
Shuey and O’Rand, 2004; Dynan, 2009). This conversion was accompanied in the United 
States by the emergence of investment clubs (Harrington, 2008). In France, the use of tax 
exemptions has developed on a similar scale, but the main beneficiaries have had less 
guidance in navigating the new financial and tax schemes at their disposal. Besides, the 
retirement system is based on social insurance, hence the majority of the population does not 
need to use the market to make provisions for future risks.  As a consequence, the asymmetry 
between financial experts and laypeople is more salient than in other countries. The example 
of real-estate investment is particularly enlightening because it concerns a large number of 
taxpayers who want to save for the future but lack the necessary understanding of the legal 
schemes offered to them. 
In France, since the late 1970s, successive governments have introduced many tax 
breaks
1
 to draw taxpayers’ savings into markets, especially in the housing sector. The Robien, 
Scellier, Censi-Bouvard and Pinel schemes – the main real-estate tax exemption 
arrangements, named after the ministers who promoted them – alone represent altogether 
more than €1.76 billion. Whereas for a long time the state invested in building social housing, 
this public policy has been progressively rechanneled towards a whole series of direct aids to 
tenants and tax incentives for would-be property owners (Pollard, 2009).  By reducing the 
income tax of those who engage in “buy-to-rent” investments (with a mandatory period of 
nine years
2
), these schemes aim at stimulating the building of new rental properties
3
. These 
peculiar tools of government have not yet been studied, despite their weight in tax 
expenditures.  
By focusing on tax exemptions in the French housing sector, we show that 
intermediation by private actors not only impacts organizations and economic behaviors, but 
also attitudes towards the law and the representations of legality: similar to the organizations 
described in the literature on legal endogeneity, the people who make such investments are 
“resocialized by law” (Edelman and Suchman, 1999: 981). In the case of households who sign 
up for real-estate investments, legality is shaped by how people perceive the domestic 
                                                 
1
 Depending on the year, they were equivalent to between a quarter and a third of all tax revenue; in 2016 there 
were still 451 such exemptions, amounting to €89.9 billion. 
2
 The conditions regarding the length of the rental, the reality of the rental, the location of the property, and the 
rent may then change according to the laws. 
3
 These schemes incentivizing investment in rental property, a French specificity, have had some degree of 
success. Two thirds of the sales of new housing sales were made in the framework of the “Scellier” and 
“Robien” laws when these schemes were set up. 
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economy and risk: the decisions people make affect their private lives and their self-image. 
While most research on legal intermediation has focused on how organizations shape law, in 
this article we want to consider legal intermediation as a power relation (Dobbin, 2005, p. 27) 
between professionals representing large firms and laypeople who believe they are pursuing 
their own interest. 
A first stage of our analysis aims to understand how private actors, in this case the 
sales representatives acting for big real-estate developers, take over and use the law for 
commercial purposes: through a comprehensive effort of persuasion, they succeed in selling 
properties to individuals by presenting tax-exemption schemes set up by the state. We then 
show that the work of legal intermediation contributes to a power relation between 
professionals who thoroughly understand the possible uses of the law and the laypeople who 
are the public of these real-estate tax-exemption policies. This power relation cannot, 
however, be reduced to a one-sided relation of domination: laypeople’s capacities to resist 
depend on their economic resources and their ability to deal with financial matters. The 
commercial use of law impacts taxpayers’ representations of law and justice, and also 
modifies these misled users’ relation to the state.  
 
 Sources and methods 
Whereas research on policy feedback (Pierson, 1993; Mettler and Soss, 2004) has not paid 
much attention to the social heterogeneity of the groups targeted by public policies, in this 
article we wish to focus on the social characteristics of the private individuals who invest in 
real estate, which raises several methodological difficulties. In the case of tax incentives 
negotiated at a distance, there is no physical place where the taxpayers who may benefit from 
these measures can be found. To meet them, we went through an association defending the 
victims of tax exempted rental investments. The interviewees who contacted us following the 
email sent to all the members have two particularities. First, they consider they have been 
cheated, mainly because they have discovered that the real value of the property they bought 
is actually much lower than what they paid for; their disappointment may also have to do with 
the characteristics of the property (location, neighborhood) or the difficulties they encounter 
in renting it. Second, many of these purchasers who consider themselves cheated are involved 
through the association in legal actions against the sales representatives who sold them these 
properties. We were able to carry out 28 interviews with people who had bought properties 
for tax-exemption purposes. Focusing on disappointed investors makes it possible to 
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reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the purchase of a property entailing a tax 
reduction and to pay attention to the actors who are blamed for the investors’ unfortunate 
situation. By then following these misled investors in their legal proceedings, this paper helps 
to understand the relationships between laypeople and various legal intermediaries: sales 
representatives who promote tax exempt properties as well as lawyers who encourage misled 
investors to initiate legal proceedings. This qualitative material was complemented by a 
survey on a sample of 2,676 individuals, collected thanks to the Elipss panel (Longitudinal 
Internet Studies for Social Sciences), an online panel that is representative of the population 
living in metropolitan France
4
. The combination of quantitative and qualitative data enables 
understanding the impact of the lower-than-expected yields on the domestic economy and the 
future plans of the people who invested in it. 
2. The commercial use of law 
The particularity of France compared with many other countries is that for a long time 
the agents of the state occupied a central place in the work of legal intermediation. But since 
the early 1980s, as in other countries (Salamon, 1995), successive governments have set up a 
growing number of partnerships with non-state actors to implement public policies (see in this 
issue Pélisse, forthcoming). The example of the tax-exemption schemes favoring investments 
in real estate perfectly illustrate this new form of regulation that privileges intervention by the 
“hidden welfare state” (Howard, 1997). Far from standing apart from the state authorities, 
private agents seek to instrumentalize it as effectively as possible in order to achieve their 
aims. Due to its reliance on private actors, the implementation of tax exemptions in the 
housing sector has drifted away from its initial goals (Pollard, 2011). 
2.1 Committing decisions 
Tax rebates in the housing sector in particular have strong repercussions on the 
activities of real-estate developers and consequently on the rate of housing construction. 
Beyond the developers, these repercussions more generally affect the whole landscape of 
financial intermediation: bankers, notaries and realtors who specialize on the sale of tax-break 
properties have been able to adapt to the changes in the regulations and have thus massively 
contributed to the “success” of real-estate tax exemption. Banks, for example, have expanded 
their tax-advice departments. Beyond them, a whole network of firms and sales 
representatives have played an active part in the sale of these various tax devices.  
                                                 
4
 For more details, see http://quanti.dime-shs.sciences-po.fr/en/. 
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The main objective is to convince taxpayers of the possibility of turning flows – even 
small sums, regularly set aside – into a valued, visible asset generating future income – 
capital, in other words. The logos devised by the firms specializing in tax exemption highlight 
the security of investment in brick and mortar, and are used as a certificate of quality 
(Stanziani, 2004). 
All our interviewees bought their properties after having been approached by a sales 
representative who had expounded on the benefits of tax exemptions and real-estate 
investment. Some were contacted by telephone, some through an acquaintance, others through 
a bank employee. In all cases, they were persuaded to buy small apartments for which they 
paid between €100,000 and €200,000, entirely through loans. The properties in which they 
invested were all located in medium-sized towns hundreds of miles from their own homes. 
Many expected to keep the property for the time required to qualify for tax exemption (often 
nine years) and then sell it, making a handsome capital gain (“plus value immobilière”) on the 
sale. But after a few years, they realized that their investment had turned into a financial loss: 
the ancillary costs had increased, the property was in an area where tenants were difficult to 
find, and when they had their property appraised, they found out the real value was generally 
half what they had paid for (a figure the legal intermediary had persuaded them was an 
excellent deal).  
Despite being a risky, long-term commitment, the decision to embark on the purchase 
of a property, on credit, for tax-exemption purposes is, in most cases, taken fairly quickly. 
One interviewee described the conditions in which he was led to take this decision. Aged 61, 
he was living alone in a small town near the Swiss border, where he had worked as a 
technician (annual income €33,000) until he was made redundant and set himself up as a self-
employed vendor of alternative medicines. He was approached at home in September 2006, 
just after the death of his father, which left him “emotionally fragile.” In September and 
October, he had several meetings with a salesman, who described in glowing terms the 
performance of real-estate investments and handed him a brochure explaining the profits he 
could expect from his own investment:  
“You can build up a final sum of €181,216, yielding additional annual income and 
pension of €8,889, with just €76,946 capital invested. With this sum of €181,216 that 
you will have built up with the aid of guaranteed rental income, you will have made a 
significant gain of €23,871 over 10 years or €28,354 over 20 years, ensuring you a 
profitable financial operation, with an internal annual yield, after tax, of 9.48%. With 
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just €76,947 capital invested, you will have made a net gain of €104,270, and all this 
for an average monthly outlay of €321 over a period of 20 years.” 
 
In mid-October, he signed a preliminary contract, and in early November, he had an 
appointment at the bank to set the conditions of the loan, the investment being financed 
entirely on credit. The advisor at the bank who met him with the salesman persuaded him to 
take out a loan in Swiss francs. The loan application was rapidly approved by the bank at the 
end of December, and on February 8, he signed the purchase agreement in the notary’s office. 
So, in a few months, he had become the owner of a new property bought on credit for tax-
exemption purposes. The rental started one year later (in 2008), once the property was built. 
In 2010, because of difficulties in renting, the increased service charges, and the financial 
problems he ran into when he was made redundant, he considered selling the property, 
accepting the loss of the tax exemption – in fact he eventually had to repay €9,000 to the tax 
authorities. He had several valuations made and then discovered that the apartment was 
valued at €70,000, less than half the price he had paid for it. To pay off his loan, which had 
grown considerably because of the dramatic rise in the value of the Swiss franc, he was forced 
to sell his main residence in March 2014. 
How do taxpayers with little knowledge of financial or tax matters end up very promptly 
signing up to investments that commit them for several years?  How do legal intermediaries 
persuade them to engage in such investments, which later prove to have been disastrous? 
Commitment, in this sense, refers to situations “where a person finds that his involvement in 
social organization has, in effect, made side bets for him and thus constrained his future 
activity” (Becker, 1960: 36). 
2.2  Behind the trust in legal intermediaries: the shadow of the state 
The first particularity of private legal intermediaries is that they work for large real-
estate developers. They introduce themselves to their clients using vague terms: as asset 
managers, real-estate or investment experts, or tax specialists. In fact, they have no training in 
law or finance and only know about the tax break that will enable their client to reduce their 
tax bill. A job description for a seller of this type of scheme states for example: “Beginner 
accepted, training provided, motivating salary, no ceiling.” No previous experience in the area 
is required, but the candidate must have “a taste for challenges, an appetite for results and a 
determination to exceed your goals.” One interviewee, approached by a salesman and 
impressed by the scheme, was himself invited to join the sales network. Having no previous 
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knowledge of taxation or real estate, he relates his surprise at the content of the training 
courses he attended: 
Living in a small town a few miles from the Swiss border, he had first worked as a nurse 
before becoming a manager in a Swiss hospital. The property was bought on his 
initiative when he was still married. He has since divorced and has to deal with with the 
consequences of this momentous purchase.  
“In these meetings, they explain that there is a lot of money to be made. And then I told 
myself; but where is the social dimension in all this? Because they sell it to you 
saying: ‘Yes, socially it’s excellent.’ And then in fact what you find is that it’s only the 
financial benefits that lie behind the operation: for you, and for the advisors. We were 
told to present ourselves as specialists in asset management, despite having no skills in 
that area. When I asked the question, they told me I could talk to my neighbors about it 
and get them to sign up…. And at that point I said: ‘Enough!’”  
 
His disappointment was first triggered by the absence of a “social dimension”: helping 
alleviate the housing shortage, increasing the supply while offering affordable rents, were 
arguments that had persuaded him to sign up for such an investment. Moreover, the training 
he attended was extremely rudimentary and contained none of the technical aspects he 
expected. Finally, the undisguised emphasis on the profitability of the operation alerted him to 
the nature of the contract he had signed a few months earlier. 
 These sales representatives play the role of intermediaries between the taxpayers and the 
law, while advancing their own interests: they get a 10% commission (or more) on the value 
of each property they manage to sell. Rather than just implementing the law, they orient and 
adapt the application of the law in line with the interests of the firms for which they work. The 
properties they offer are located in areas where it is advantageous to build and where they 
have agreements with several building firms that take part in the project. They sell not just a 
property but a package including the notary’s fee and the bank loan. Their whole aim is to 
build up a relation of “trust” (Shapiro, 1987; Bradach, Eccles, 1989) so that the client will 
decide to buy a property even in cases where he or she has not the means or the need to do so. 
To achieve this, they rely on other professionals with whom they work in partnership and who 
are directly and financially interested in the conclusion of the transaction. The foremost of 
these is the representative of the bank which grants the loan and then the notary who oversees 
the transaction. To produce this trust, the sales representatives use various persuasion 
strategies which mingle commercial and non-commercial considerations (Granovetter, 1985). 
The advisors first exploit networks of mutual acquaintance linked to the personal 
sphere. Several interviewees were approached in an informal context: a dinner with friends, a 
phone call in which the advisor emphasized mutual acquaintances: he was the “friend of a 
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friend,” a student who graduated the same year as the interviewee’s spouse, etc. The 
recommendations that arise from interpersonal networks facilitate commercial exchanges 
(Baker, 1984; Chan, 2012; Uzzi, 1996; White, 2002) and become the nucleus of an expanding 
clientele. As with access to the labor market (Granovetter, 1973), it is not the close family 
circle who is mobilized but rather contacts with individuals whom the purchaser knows at a 
distance – either through his or her occupational activity, or as a client, or through networks 
of friendship. Potential clients who are approached in this way give more credence to the 
salesman’s word because they are already trustful. In the first stage, the sales representatives 
may benefit from the positive effect of reputation linked to the satisfaction of clients who, in 
the early years, mainly see the benefits in their tax bills. The sizeable gap between the 
decision to invest and awareness of the harm suffered works in their favor. Thus, legal 
intermediation sets up a power relation that initially works in the mode of mutual 
acquaintance – in many cases, the commercial relationship is embedded in more personal 
connections. 
The relation of trust that is built through this commercial relationship is also based on 
a sacralized representation of the law and of the agents who produce it. The sales 
representatives emphasize the legal dimension – that is to say, the institutional and state-
sponsored dimension of the contracts they offer their clients. The possibility of tax exemption 
is not just a motivating argument in financial terms: it is also a powerful vector of symbolic 
legitimacy in the sense that this is a device set up and organized by the state. The social and 
symbolic power of the law (Bourdieu, 1986) is a crucial element in the legitimization of these 
contracts. The security of bricks and mortar is associated with the state, which appears as the 
guarantor of the enforcement of the commercial relationship (North, 1991: 99). In dealings 
with private intermediaries, the label of a scheme organized and overseen by the state 
constitutes a reassuring element, a factor of trust. Sales representatives do indeed make 
extensive use of this official and institutional dimension. The logos used to sell these schemes 
systematically highlight the term “law” (see Figure 1), so as to benefit from the legitimacy 
associated with the legal process. As a further part of this marketing work, many sales 
brochures feature the logo of the state – the French flag and the motto Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité over the words République française – which appears in all administrative 
documents. All this symbolism generates trust, as this interviewee explains: 
A former police officer, he is now a high ranking civil servant. He owns property in 
Paris and is married with no children. He is the one who manages the household 
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budget, paperwork, and taxes. In 2007 and again in 2009, he bought two apartments 
under real-estate tax exemption schemes. 
“I didn’t worry much about where I was buying because we were dealing with 
schemes organized and guaranteed by the state. […] The state puts its seal on it. So 
there’s no risk. What risk would there be? There is the mayor as guarantor, 
representing the state at town level, authorizing the construction of a building where 
there is big demand. So I didn’t ask myself existential questions in terms of price and 
so on. […] I didn’t check, I took it trustfully. It was Pinel, Borloo, Scellier, the state, in 
other words. We need to build, they tell you, there is not enough housing in France. So 
you don’t ask questions.” 
This interviewee listed a whole series of actors who explain how the state appeared to him as 
a guarantor: from the mayor who authorized the development, to the definition of the 
construction zones in the texts that define the tax-exemption, and the recital of the names of 
the various ministers who initiated each of them. The trust placed in the state is a constant 
background guaranteeing the solidity of these operations, even for interviewees who work in 
the private sector.  
The production of trust in legal intermediation is finally based on a relational effort 
(Cochoy, 2007) which consists in stressing the technical dimension of the product so that the 
client readily places his faith in the competence of the intermediary. The interviewees 
describe the many graphs and figures handled with ease by the sales representatives, from the 
first meeting: “He showed me his statistics in the form of graphs, I couldn’t make head or tail 
of it. I never liked math”; “He seemed like a very professional salesman, quite restrained, very 
technical”; “She showed us impressive graphs of capital growth; she made calculations”; “He 
showed you with a diagram, a curve, how you could pay less tax; he used lots of technical 
terms that I didn’t understand.” These brief remarks indicate that the interviewees were 
impressed by these salespeople, in both senses: they were both intimidated and won over by 
their apparent mastery of financial data and techniques. The prospective clients are 
overwhelmed by a seller who seems to master a subject of which they know little. In the 
present case, the commercial relationship does not lead to a transfer of knowledge that would 
enable the consumer to acquire competences and proceed without the prescriber (Hatchuel, 
1995); the social relationship that is formed around tax exemption makes the buyer dependent 
on the seller. The intertwining of legal intermediation and trust sets up an asymmetrical 
relationship: it is an exchange relationship based on inequality inasmuch as the layperson 
must put himself in the hands of a professional who is both interpreter and seller. It is this 
confusion of roles that opens the way to abuses in the work of intermediation. 
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The construction of the relation of trust by the sales representatives is based on a 
combination of social and commercial considerations (Zelizer, 1979), but it does not affect all 
taxpayers in the same way. Those who are most inclined to entrust themselves completely to 
the advisors and consider themselves duped also have particular social characteristics. 
3. Legal intermediation as a power relation: Unequally endowed laypeople 
If sales representative make every effort to build a relation of trust with potential 
investors, these efforts do not always pay off. Legal intermediation become a power relation 
especially when potentiel clients leave it up to sales representatives. To understand that, one 
has to take into account the various ressources of households concerned. The tax-exemption 
schemes have also to be replaced in the range of tax incentives offered to them. 
3.1. Tax exemptions and their public 
Tax-exemption schemes are officially targeted at a public of executives with high 
incomes and strong savings capacity, but in practice the sales representatives address a much 
broader population. The survey gives an insight into the social characteristics of the taxpayers 
who decided to make tax-exempt real-estate investments. On the basis of this survey, it is 
possible, in particular, to compare two types of practices giving rise to a tax reduction: 
donations to charities or associations and the main investments subject to tax reductions 
(investment in rental property, investment in the capital of a small company or in overseas 
French territories).  
Figure 1: Proportion of households benefiting from a tax exemption by monthly income  
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
Less than €2,000 €2,000 to €2,500 €2,500 to €4000 €4,000 to €6,000 Over €6000 
Donations to associations and charities  Tax-free investments[1] 
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Source: Pratiques and représentations face à l’État (February 2017), Équipes 
PREFACE/ELIPSS, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP), Centre de Données 
Socio-Politiques (CDSP). 
Population: Interviewees who answered the questions on income and tax exemptions 
(N=2411). 
How to read: 15 % of taxpayers living in a household with a monthly income over €6,000 
benefited from a tax reduction for tax-exempt investments. 
NB: Proportion of positive answers for one box. 
 
These two practices are correlated with income: the percentage of taxpayers who say they 
have made donations or tax-exempt investments rises with the amount of available resources 
(Figure 1). Moreover, only 23 % of households with monthly resources over €6,000 benefit 
from no tax exemption, whereas this is the case for 55% of households with monthly 
resources between €2,000 and €2,500. However, the distribution of making donations or tax-
exempt investments is very different. In the case of donations, income sensitivity does not 
mean the practice is reserved to an elite: even among households with less than €2,000 
monthly income, 15 % state that they have made donations. Tax-exempt investments, by 
contrast, are a practice that seems to be less widespread: no more than 2 % of households with 
monthly resources less than €4,000 make use of them. This practice is thus much more 
frequent in households with substantial resources. While households with monthly resources 
over €6,000 are four times more to make donations than households with monthly resources 
under €2,000, the ratio rises to fifteen times more for tax-exempt investments. This is no 
doubt explained by the heterogeneity of the amounts in question: they may be very low for 
donations (€100) whereas tax-exempt investments often require a capital of €10,000.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of taxpayers benefiting from a tax exemption by socio-
occupational category 
 
Donations to 
associations and 
charities  
Tax-exempt 
investments 
Whole 
population 
Farmers 1.6 % 3.8 % 1.6 % 
Self-employed craftsmen and 
traders and heads of businesses 4.5 % 14.4 % 5.8 % 
Executives and higher mental 
occupations 28.8 % 38.7 % 16.9 % 
Intermediate occupations 31.2 % 26.7 % 26 % 
Clerical employees  23.3 % 12.8 % 30.2 % 
Manual workers 10.7 % 3.6 % 19.4 % 
All 100%  100% 100% 
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Source: Pratiques et représentations face à l’État (February 2017), Équipes 
PREFACE/ELIPSS, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP), Centre de Données 
Socio-Politiques (CDSP). 
Population: All persons who answered the question on occupation (N=2411; fourth column) 
and who made either donations (N= 898; second column) or tax-exempt investments (N= 121; 
third column). 
How to read: Of the taxpayers who benefited from a tax reduction for a tax-exempt 
investment, 38.7 % are executives. 
When one considers all taxpayers who made a tax-exempt investment (Table 1), it can 
be seen that a large proportion of them are in white-collar occupations (they make up almost 
40 % of the taxpayers using them). Whereas manual and clerical workers make up almost 
50 % of the whole population and more than 30 % of the taxpayers making donations, they 
account for only 16.4 % of the people who made a tax-exempt investment (Table 1). 
Taxpayers getting tax exemptions by virtue of investments are thus mainly recruited among 
the executives and the intermediate occupations. It can thus be stated that the investor 
population is over-represented in the higher classes. Tax-exempt investments stand out by the 
length of the commitment they entail, which may explain why those who make use of them 
are higher-up in the social hierarchy. 
While we have identified the social characteristics of the households which made tax-
exempt investments, the persons we interviewed are harder to situate precisely. When they 
made their investment, they were financially relatively stable: they all owned their main 
residence and the great majority no longer owed money on it. Some are in intermediate 
occupations, or were independent craftsmen or clerical workers, but most are private-sector 
executives (11 interviewees out of 28), heads of small businesses or professionals. The 
financial loss resulting from the investment affects them very differently, depending on the 
stability of their situation. For the majority, the investment primarily affects previous savings 
rather than the income used for current expenditures. The interviewees with the smallest 
incomes are the hardest hit; some found themselves over-indebted and were sometimes forced 
to sell their main residence. Others had to moderate their lifestyle because of the additional 
costs entailed by the investment: 
This auxiliary nurse in a private clinic, married to an independent craftsman, lives 
with her husband and two children near a large city. While her husband makes the 
financial decisions, she deals with all the paperwork and is in charge of the day-to-
day spending. 
“Every month, I liked to buy myself something; if I wanted to, I would spend €150. I 
don’t do that any more, that’s for sure. And I say to myself, too bad, we have to… I 
don’t ‘need’ it, but all the same you need to treat yourself. When you reach the age of 
50, you think you ought to be able to, but I can tell you I have reduced the budget.” 
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Thus, the investment that was made for accumulation purposes – or even to attain a higher 
social status – brings about déclassement. How can one explain that these taxpayers, who are 
relatively strongly endowed economically and socially, place their faith in salespeople 
extolling the merits of these investments? To understand it, we have to examine the 
relationship formed with the intermediaries who market such investments. 
3.2  Laypeople ill-equipped to stand up to “professionals”  
Taxpayers who lack the skills to embark alone in complex schemes are the preferred 
targets for the salespeople, as shown by the account of this retired speech therapist:  
Having first worked as a self-employed speech therapist and then as an employee, 
this taxpayer is now retired, like her husband, a former salesman in a small 
electrical goods business. In the household, she deals with administrative matters, 
handles the budget, and deals with tax matters. She relates how they had had a tax 
reduction of €3,000 for loan interest when they bought their house and, some years 
later, launched into a much bigger operation: 
- “In 2007, my husband was already thinking of a tax-exempt investment, 
whereas I chiefly wanted our children to be able to house themselves properly. 
We talked about it with our advisor at the bank, who recommended us to 
another person who sold apartments under a tax-exemption scheme. What I 
liked about it was that it was two-way.”  
- “What do you mean?” 
- “He explained to us that there was a housing shortage and this scheme 
produced affordable rented accommodation. We were naïve. He told us it was a 
well-located apartment, in an expanding town where there would soon be 
schools, shops – a very desirable area. We trusted him implicitly. We were so 
trusting that we didn’t look at property prices in the area. We bought it on a 
credit plan for €145,000, without knowing the prices in the town…. When it 
was finished we had a look, and we saw how we had been duped: it’s next to a 
highway which makes terrible noise. But it was too late. Now it is valued at 
€55,000.” 
 
Like many taxpayers of her age, this young retiree, who had paid off her main 
residence, wondered how to make use of her savings, without having skills in investment 
matters. Having already benefited from tax reductions for her main residence, she was 
immediately won over by her bank advisor’s suggestion that she invest in a new property and 
be exempted from income tax on the corresponding sums. With a lay person’s relation to 
taxation, she therefore let herself be referred (“trusting implicitly”) to a salesman who offered 
the couple the opportunity to buy on credit an apartment subject to tax exemption: by 
committing themselves to rent it for nine years, they could expect a tax reduction equivalent 
to the instalments on the loan over the whole period. Having no initial capital, the couple 
abandoned the (wife’s) idea of buying an apartment that could be used immediately by their 
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children and embarked on the tax-exemption project preferred by the husband, which meant 
not being able to choose the location and having to wait several years before using it 
themselves. This change of direction accepted by the household was based on three main 
arguments. Having already benefited from several tax-exemption schemes, the couple thought 
they were taking a decision in line with the previous ones, whereas it was in fact a real 
investment decision committing them over a longer period. Next, the tax reduction 
mechanism was encouraged by the state, which lent it an intrinsic legitimacy: for taxpayers 
unused to investing, the choice of putting one’s savings into real estate is rather reassuring, 
especially under a scheme backed by the authorities. Finally, the measure was presented as a 
way of facilitating access to housing for students or families living in “expanding areas” 
where accommodation is in short supply. This opportunity to combine an individual 
advantage via tax exemption with a contribution to a good cause constitutes a third, more 
symbolic argument: for many middle-class households, this form of property ownership is 
also a way of demarcating themselves from the working classes by adopting the optimization 
practices of the upper classes. Like many others, the couple did not take the time to visit the 
site or inform themselves about local property prices. Lacking the means to hire the services 
of an accountant or an asset manager, they put themselves in the hands of these sales 
representatives who offered them a ready-made purchase for which they had to make no 
administrative effort. Having been persuaded that they could thereby reduce their tax bill and 
at the same time build up capital for their retirement, they indebted themselves for several 
years to purchase an over-valued, poorly located apartment. A year or two later, the apartment 
bought on credit turned out to be hard to rent and over priced. This account illustrates the 
attractiveness of tax-exemption schemes for middle-class households seeking to reduce their 
tax bills and, at the same time, derive advantages for the future. Lacking the expertise to 
handle housing loans and the tax-exemption rules, they are more likely to lose their way than 
more experienced taxpayers or those better guided in this area. 
The aggrieved taxpayers often mention their incompetence in financial and tax matters 
to explain their gullibility and the trust they placed in the salesman. An engineer, married to a 
teacher with whom he had just bought a house on credit when signed up to buy a tax-
investment property, recalls the painful memory of this investment, which led to financial 
losses: 
“They created a lot of small investors, who had just about enough to invest but knew 
nothing about investment, and they presented things to them in a hyper-simplistic way, 
when they weren’t simple at all. But really I’m not an investor, I just wanted to set 
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aside a bit of money for my retirement, build up a nest for my children, that’s all…. I 
really wanted to do it for the sake of security.” 
In this extract, the engineer counterposes a logic of investment, specific to experienced 
operators, and a logic of savings, that of the laypeople among whom he classifies himself. The 
tax-exemption schemes set up by the state lead to confusion between saver and investor, and 
this ambiguity gives rise to disappointment. Unlike buyers who can and know they should 
consult one or more advisors to weigh the risks of each decision, they found themselves in a 
“forced channeling” (Trompette, 2007: 5). They were approached about a construction project 
which might not even have started and which involved capital that was largely fictitious at the 
moment of signing: most of the investments require no initial input and are therefore based on 
monthly instalments in the years to come. The risk is therefore less perceptible than when the 
capital at stake is already assembled.  
Another engineer worked in an executive role in an aeronautics firm in southern 
France. Having divorced, he found himself handling the administrative and tax matters that 
his wife used to address. He relates:  
“They were the ones who came looking for me. I didn’t even know you could get tax 
exemption, I tell you, I knew nothing about all that. If you ask me to fix your computer 
or make a drone fly, or how a mechanical watch works, then I can draw you diagrams, 
explain everything to you, but if you ask me how tax exemption works, anything 
administrative, there I know absolutely nothing. So, these people came looking for me, 
I didn’t ask anyone for anything.” 
While he has a significant income from his executive status and modest liquid savings 
which he wants to use to pay for his daughter’s higher education, this interviewee had never 
thought about ways of investing this money. He placed himself in a logic of accumulation 
oriented more towards capital build-up than yield. The salesman indeed invited him to invest 
without drawing on his savings, envisaging an entirely loan-based scheme. He encouraged 
him to commit himself for money he did not yet have. The terms of the discussion remained 
very abstract: the capital involved was not visible, the money to be borrowed did not yet exist, 
and the apartment was virtual because it was not yet built.  
Lack of financial expertise, mentioned by the interviewees to explain their 
misfortunes, does not suffice to explain the relation of domination established by the 
salespeople. Indeed, some respondents diverge from the image of the layperson in financial 
and tax matters that is found in most of the interviews. For example, a microelectronics 
engineer with a PhD, working in a start-up, described at length the set of precautions he took 
before embarking on a purchase of real estate: he “reworked all the calculations” to check the 
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outline plan he had been given, considered that he had “quite quickly understood how it 
worked,” and stressed that he had refused a loan in Swiss francs as “too dangerous” and 
himself negotiated a loan from his bank. In this case, as in some others, his signing up to a 
risky investment did not stem from a lack of competence in financial and tax matters, but 
from a relation of deference towards the law and the intermediaries who claim to work for it. 
The technical nature of law and taxation is conducive to the development of a 
relationship of delegation, favored by sales representatives who offer to take charge of 
everything, from management of the property to help with the tax declaration, including 
negotiating a loan from a bank and finding a notary. This delegation is initially seen as 
positive, for people who want to invest their money without investing too much time. This is 
why the interviewees agreed to buy apartments sometimes very far from their own homes, 
imagining they would never need to go there because everything was taken care of. The 
relation of delegation is also induced by numerous reassuring signals that the salesman gives 
from the first encounter, by visiting the clients at home and promising to assist them 
throughout the process. The interviewees describe them as affable experts, precise, generous 
with their time: “The gentleman made a very good impression”; “The man was very… yes, 
very nice. And he really knew how to talk to people at their level”; “But very charming, you 
know. Charming, good-looking, and everything.” This mechanism of delegation to a figure 
perceived as competent is reminiscent of the relation of deference toward the educational 
system among populations deprived of cultural capital (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979). As in 
the case of the educational institution, someone who follows the rules has less chance of 
making the most of it than someone who has learned to play with the rules, without following 
them to the letter. Legal intermediation functions like any institution possessing a legitimate 
knowledge: the technical character of tax matters makes it possible to distinguish those who 
have learned to be wary of intermediaries and keep them under control and those who entrust 
themselves completely to them. The difference may be fine, but it seems essential for 
understanding the impression of having been duped through lack of awareness of the risks 
associated with these investments. 
The taxpayers endowed with the most economic capital do not necessarily have a 
greater grasp of financial matters; they may even find administrative documents and tax forms 
repellent (Sherman, 2017). Unlike small savers who see tax reduction as an end in itself, they 
have sufficient resources to optimize their investment decisions by targeting yield and not 
being locked in a tax-based logic: 
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 “As regards tax on individuals, there are many ways of optimizing your tax bill. 
Personally, I have already made two tax-exempt investments, under the Scellier 
scheme, taking care that they were in areas where you could easily be rented out. I 
didn’t do it in a development of 500 dwellings built next to a village with 1,000 
habitants. I took advice from my advisor at the bank and from a friend who is an 
asset manager. It’s an investment, after all, and not a decision to be taken lightly…. 
I’ve never had unpleasant surprises with tax exemption.” 
Interview with finance manager of a fashion business, Paris. 
 
The former head of an IT firm who specializes in management takes a close interest in 
all the ways of optimizing the tax bills of his various clients and is also careful to minimize 
his own contributions. He sees these schemes as investment-leverage devices and chooses 
them on economic and accounting criteria, taking advantage of the windfall effect of these 
opportunities. His way of using tax-exemption schemes is very different from that of the 
taxpayers we encountered, who, enchanted by the idea of reducing their taxes, entrust 
themselves to the expertise of salespeople working on behalf of real-estate firms.  
Laypeople are unequally equipped to stand up to sales representatives. What 
distinguishes them from other purchasers is not so much their economic, financial, and 
taxation competences as their deference toward legal intermediaries, the place of investment 
in the household finances, and also the captive configuration in which they find themselves. 
Legal intermediation is thus the source of a division between users who entrust themselves 
completely to intermediaries and others who can afford to face possible financial setbacks 
and/or are concerned to keep full control of the capital at stake. 
4. The production of distrust of the legal system 
The interesting aspect of the cases of the taxpayers misled by tax-exemption 
salespeople also lie in the experience that many of them had with the legal system. When they 
realized the losses they had incurred, some tried to secure redress and contacted an association 
for the defense of investors
5
. They very quickly had an interview with the chairwoman, who 
encouraged them to mobilize the other purchasers of the building where they had bought their 
property, so to engage a collective action. They were then brought into contact with a second 
type of legal intermediaries: lawyers specializing the legal representation of duped investors. 
With these legal professionals, intermediation was again a source of domination for laypeople 
                                                 
5
 The association was created in 2008 by a former saleswoman who had worked for a firm specializing the sale 
of tax devices encouraging investment. In her book (C. Giroz, Défiscalisation ou défricalisation. Marignier: 
Éditions Le Porte-Voix, 2012) she describes how for several years she sold such investments to clients and a 
network of acquaintances until she realized the recurrent risks and poor yields of these investments. 
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who did not always understand legal procedures and most of whom were encountering the 
legal system for the first time. As the long and expensive procedure went on, their positive 
view of lawyers, justice, and the state progressively turned into a deep sense of mistrust. 
4.1. Starting an action: a prospect of redress 
For many of these cheated taxpayers, engaging a legal action offered a prospect of 
securing redress, on the condition that were aware of the wrong done to them (“naming”) and 
could identify those responsible (“blaming”) (Felstiner, Abel, Sarat, 1980). For example, a 
teacher in a public conservatory describes how she understood the cause of her misfortunes 
while listening to a radio program in which a Paris-based lawyer described the plight of 
people who, like her, had lost money on a property investment: 
“There were lawyers and the testimony of people who had done the same operation as 
me. They described what had happened to them, and it was exactly the scenario I had 
gone through. I could see myself in it. […] And then I said to myself, ‘That’s it, now I 
understand, it’s a great fraud.’ Somehow that was a relief, because I had been cheated 
and somehow I knew I was not responsible. I had been stupid, of course, but it wasn’t 
bad management on my part. At last I understood the situation.” 
Struggling with debt after becoming unable to repay her mortgage, she describes this 
radio broadcast as a turning point at which she became aware for the first time that other 
people had also been misled and that she could put herself in the hands of a specialist to seek 
redress through the legal system (“claiming”). For her, akin to the other cheated savers, the 
prospect of undertaking a legal action was a way of retaking control and giving legal and 
political meaning to their sense of victimization. Because the cost of a consultation was not 
very high, many asked the lawyer for an opinion on their individual case in order to know 
their chances of winning. Those who engaged an action were often neither the richest nor the 
poorest, but rather those who had been hit hard enough financially to have to change their 
lifestyle but who could still find the resources to take legal action. The harm done to them was 
seen as an insult; it was also a matter of “keeping face” (Goffman, 1959) and obtaining legal 
recognition of their status as victims. Many of them thus started legal proceedings with a view 
to obtaining redress and avoiding the role of passive victim. This interviewee, living in the 
Paris metropolitan area, trained as an engineer but now working as a sales executive for a car 
company, had invested in a tax-exempt property and explains the reasons that led to start the 
proceedings: 
“I didn’t intend to leave it at that. Even if the lawyer cost me still more money and 
even if I did not get redress, at least I would have tried what it takes to be 
compensated. For me it was a way of showing the people who made me buy this 
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property that I wouldn’t let them get away with it, that they couldn’t just ring doorbells 
and rip off everyone like that, that some people would stand up for themselves.” 
The legal action (“claiming”) thus took on a symbolic significance: it enabled the 
misled investors to reverse the stigma of the confidence trick and show that their story was 
not the product of individual but of an organized deception by professionals who should be 
punished and sanctioned. The association strengthened them in this idea by encouraging them 
to fight a battle in the name of small savers against the banks and the tax-exemption 
marketers. But while presenting itself as a legal intermediary alongside the victims, it 
maintained an ambivalent attitude toward the courts: the legal system was presented both as a 
tribunal from which one could obtain redress and as a wheel in a system that protects the 
powerful and crushes the weakest. Thus, one reads in the book published by the chairwoman 
that “the embryonic revolt of some investors suffered unfairly from the ignorance of the 
authorities and the judges”6. The association engaged them in a legal battle which it explained 
in advance it might not necessarily win, implicitly suggesting that the judges and the 
developers would protect each other. This was also a way of excusing itself in advance of a 
trial in which the investors lost. 
The whole work of the association consisted in hearing and grouping the complaints of 
the cheated savers: it asked each claimant to mobilize all the other purchasers of the estate so 
as to organize a collective action which could be brought before the courts. It then referred 
them to two lawyers who presented themselves as specialists in commercial contracts and 
who reformulated an individual and singular wrong into an injustice perpetrated against 
savers. They could thus play the role of “cause lawyers” (Sarat and Scheingold, 1998). A 
former senior manager in a publicly owned enterprise, now retired, relates first meeting with 
these legal professionals:  
“When we heard the lawyers talk on the subject, we thought they were people 
committed to a certain justice. They were not seeking gain but helping people who had 
been cheated. It isn’t right that people are cheated. We thought they were on the side 
of social justice.” 
Far from stressing the legal dimension of tax-exemption schemes, the lawyers, like the 
association that recommended them, emphasized their commitment to secure justice for 
people cheated by a coalition of the powerful – developers, banks, notaries, and insurance 
companies. It was this image that subsequently, when the complainants’ case entered the 
judicial arena, began to fade away. 
                                                 
6
 C. Giroz, Défiscalisation ou défricalisation. Marignier: Éditions Le Porte-Voix, 2012, p. 23. 
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4.2. The production of distrust 
The relationship that formed between the lawyers and their lay clients progressively 
revealed a relation of domination at the expense of laypeople who did not master legal 
proceedings and were forced to entrust themselves to experts. As they waited and saw their 
requests for advice ignored, the clients of these lawyers began to distrust these professionals. 
Many of them felt they received little support and shared with others their sense of 
abandonment. One of them was this hospital manager:  
“I think all the same the worst thing is feeling alone. Now, I have the impression of 
having written checks and just having to wait for justice. […] The only recourse you 
have is to pay a lawyer, who gives you very little information. You see, you have the 
impression of being shut out…. The lawyer tells me nothing. Not a word. And I have 
the impression that I’m disturbing him when I telephone or send an email.” 
As the proceedings wore on, there was growing tension in his relations with the 
lawyer, whom he thought treated him disdainfully. Other interviewees highlight their 
incomprehension of the legal process. In the first meeting, the lawyers had used a language of 
moral redress that they found convincing, but the confrontation with the technical character of 
the law gave rise to great incomprehension and the sense of not being listened to. This 
interviewee, an executive in an aeronautics firm who, as has been seen, had already declared 
himself incompetent in financial and tax matters, likewise says of the case:  
“When I read the documents from the lawyers, I don’t understand half of what they are 
saying. They go off into details I can’t see the point of. I ask myself, why is he telling 
me that? […]  He goes into aspects that make no sense to me but facts that seem 
fundamental to me, he doesn’t even mention.” 
The discrepancy between the wrong done to them as seen by the plaintiffs and the 
legal definition of it as formulated by their lawyer was a source of disappointment. There 
followed from it a sense of dispossession regarding a case in which they were nonetheless 
actively involved in bringing together other savers for a collective action. One was surprised 
that the bank was attacked, another that the grounds for the complaint were reformulated, or 
was concerned about the vocabulary used. This senior civil servant who followed the 
procedure closely was critical of the vocabulary used by the lawyer in his conclusions:  
“At first it was ‘victim of a calamitous investment, sir,’ and so on. Then later he 
replaces that with ‘considering himself misled and in any case having been ill-
informed.’ That’s a big difference. […] It’s staggering. You start out with the status of 
victim and then in his conclusions, he’s talking about impressions by writing 
‘considering himself misled.’ That’s unacceptable.” 
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The often negative outcome of the hearings and the cost of the procedure completed 
the reversal of the view taken of the lawyers. For one building financed by tax-exemption 
schemes, a single lawyer could take on the cases of ten or so clients brought together by the 
first plaintiff. For each individual case, the lawyer charged almost €5,000 and could double 
this sum in the event of an appeal. He could then handle a large number of cases heard in the 
same sessions and for which the arguments and procedures were identical. This collaboration 
between actors of the association and legal professionals gave a considerable scale to the 
judicialization of these disputes: the more the two lawyers dealt with similar cases, the more 
they could present themselves as specialists in these matters. 
For the plaintiffs, the financial cost of the legal action could turn out to be 
considerable. This new experience compounded the earlier grievances and gave rise to a 
feeling of distrust of the legal system, as the same complainant explained:  
“I regret it now. I regret having invested €10,000 only to end up in the same situation 
as at the start of the business…. We had no idea where we were going, we were 
stumbling from stage to stage…. My lawyer never gave me any indication…. No 
support from the state, from the legal system, in fact not from anyone. We were 
abandoned by everyone!” 
As the judicial proceedings went on, there was a growing sense of having been duped 
a second time. The accumulation of lawyers’ and court fees helped intensify a sense of 
incomprehension of a legal system that had seemed to offer the hope of redress. The 
expression “a justice that feeds itself” (“la justice se nourrit elle-même”) illustrates the 
suspicions that lurked the about the probity of the judges and his lawyer, whom he accused of 
earning money whatever the outcome of the trial. At the end of a session in which the claim 
was denied, another interviewee, who manages a small construction firm, also declared:  
“The lawyer doesn’t give a damn whether you win or lose. If you end up homeless, 
that’s not his problem. […] One contact with the legal system and you learn straight 
away. You learn that, in the end, the lawyer is there to run his business.” 
The sense of distrust is thus first expressed towards the lawyer and then progressively 
expands to the whole profession, the legal system, and also to the state. The plaintiffs’ defeat 
in the courts confirmed a sense of alienation from judicial institutions. The interviewees 
describe their indignation at an outcome that seems to them profoundly unjust. 
Legal intermediation thus reveals itself to be a paradoxical process: it was just when 
the plaintiffs had the sense of retaking control thanks to their legal battle that their sense of 
injustice was doubled by the decisions of the courts, who often awarded them neither financial 
compensation nor recognition of their status as victims. Through the trial, they had the sense 
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of reliving the wrong they had already suffered. In the interviews, the similarity in the 
vocabulary used to describe the dishonesty of the salespeople and the ineffectiveness of the 
lawyers is striking. Having failed to win their case, both symbolically and materially, the 
plaintiffs have the sense of having been obliged into legal action despite themselves. 
Altogether, their indignation and sense of being abused are directed to the courts and the 
judges: “We wouldn’t wish it on anyone to have to deal with the French justice system”; “I 
think the legal system is rotten.”  Ultimately, it is the state that is called into question, both 
because of its role as guarantor in the tax-exemption scheme and because of the impunity the 
judges guaranteed for the commercial organizations responsible for the wrongs committed. 
Many consider that the judges’ decision is explained by their wish to protect the state: “An 
unfavorable judgement would amount to admitting the responsibility of the state.” Another 
interviewee interpreted the refusal of the tribunal to recognize the wrong done to him as the 
sign of an implicit alliance between the government, real-estate developers, and judges. 
After their defeat in the courts, the plaintiffs thus felt they had doubly lost face. The 
misdeeds of the legal intermediaries had the effect of supporting or even increasing their 
distrust of judges, justice, and the state.  
 
Conclusion 
The case of tax-exempt rental properties makes it possible to confirm that the law can 
be a resource instrumentalized by economic actors (Stryker, 2003). In the case of the real-
estate tax-exemption schemes in France, commercial intermediaries were able to persuade 
savers to indebt themselves so as to buy overvalued apartments in areas where it is difficult to 
find tenants. In a second stage, lawyers as legal intermediaries were able to persuade the 
plaintiffs to undertake legal actions, whereas these people often do not see their problem as 
connected to law or rights (Yngvesson, 1993). These legal actions were often bound to fail or 
gave rise to compensation rarely covering the legal costs. Thus, the work of legal 
intermediation between these professionals and their lay clients is a power relation enabling 
one side to take full advantage of the law and leading, for the other side, to disappointment 
and disagreeable consequences. The state plays a central role in these complex power 
relations. On the one hand, it is the guarantor of legitimacy in the sale of tax-exempt real 
estate. It also appears, through the legal system, as the last-instance arbiter of disputes 
between misled clients and property developers. In the same way that Granovetter (1985) 
showed that the relationships that generate trust can also favor malfeasance, so too can legal 
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intermediation contain the same ambivalence. To measure the scale of this difference, it is 
indispensable to adopt a sociological reading that takes account of the individuals’social 
position, resources, and capacity to defend their interests. These differentiated uses of the law 
also have powerful effects on the actors’ legal consciousness, as in the case of sexual 
harassment (Marshall, 2005). We, again, find here the idea of a “managerialization” of 
understanding the law (Edelman, 2005), which stems from people’s experiences of the law’s 
application but takes different forms depending on the social position of the individuals 
concerned. It is then possible to show that representations of law and justice vary according to 
social positions of the actors involved and are closely correlated with their everyday 
experiences of these institutions. 
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